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ENVIRONMENTAL DECAY AND INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS: THE USES OF SOVEREIGNTY 
By Linda P. Shields* and Marvin C. Ott** 
I. THE PROBLEM 
Evidence accumulates daily that the production and consump-
tion activities of contemporary civilization are leading to a signifi-
cant deterioration of the natural environment which supports life on 
the planet. The authors will assume the reader shares the general 
conviction that there is an environmental problem, that it is the 
product of human activities, and that it is widespread, serious, and 
deeply rooted in our attitudes and social, economic, and political 
systems. 
To an analyst of international affairs these assumptions raise 
basic questions. What are the implications of environmental decay 
for the international political system? Will it generate additional 
sources of international instability and instruments of conflict or, 
conversely, will it spur new forms of transnational cooperation and 
integration? What governmental policies, if any, promise to 
strengthen the latter possibility and weaken the former? Will an 
effective international effort to stem the tide of environmental 
abuse require the elimination of the nation state in favor of novel 
forms of supra-national authority? Given preliminary answers to the 
above, what political strategies recommend themselves to the con-
cerned statesman? In short, our task is to enquire whether the exist-
ing international political system is compatible with an effective 
program of global environmental regeneration or, on the contrary, 
whether the fundamental restructuring of the system is a necessary 
prerequisite for such an effort. 
To determine the potential impact of present and future environ-
mental conditions on international politics it is necessary to under-
stand something of the sources and manifestations of environmental 
impairment. 
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II. THE SOURCES AND SYMPTOMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DECLINE 
In general terms the deterioration of the physical environment 
can be traced to the advent of industrial and post-industrial tech-
nology coupled with the rapid growth in human numbers. Technol-
ogy can be thought of as the skills and knowledge used by man to 
cope with his biological and psychological needs; the most notable 
aspect being the ability to utilize and control increasing amounts of 
energy through the substitution of other forms of energy for human 
and animal muscle, thereby making possible the creation of modern 
high -consum ption societies. 
Each application of knowledge and skill requires the input of 
some amount of resources from the environment. The genesis of an 
idea requires only the energy necessary to keep the brain function-
ing, but when that idea is applied resources and energy are utilized. 
Harvesting a crop, for example, requires cleared land, seed, ferti-
lizer, artificially transported water, wood and iron for tools, and 
inputs of energy throughout the process. The more advanced the 
level of technology a society uses, "from the stone axe to the nuclear 
reactor, the greater the variety and quantity of resources" and en-
ergy it consumes.! The disquieting implications of this increasing 
resource use are heightened by the fact that technology not only 
fulfills human needs, it creates them. The present standard of tech-
nical capability tends to be institutionalized into a society's politics, 
economics, and culture; thus, the perceived needs of a community 
are based not so much on a rational assessment of requirements as 
on emotion and institutional precedent. The further advanced the 
technology and living standards of a country, the more likely the 
present levels will be seen as the irreducible minimum. They are 
simply not manipulable factors in the short run. 2 
The demographic explosion-the fact that the world's human 
population is increasing exponentially-is no longer news.3 • At the 
present two percent rate of annual growth the global population will 
double in a mere thirty-five years from approximately 3.5 billion to 
7.0 billion. Current projections envisage a doubling of the popula-
tion of Latin America in 25 years and Africa in 28; the equivalent 
figures for North America and Europe are 87 and 99 years respec-
tively.4 
At a minimum, greater population means added organic pollution 
from human waste while increasing agricultural activity pressures 
the supporting ecosystem through soil and water degradation and 
the destruction of wilderness and species habitat. The most impor-
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tant factor governing the environmental impact of population in-
crease, however, is the level of technology and disposable income 
which accompanies it. 5 While all productive processes consume re-
sources and generate waste, modern industrial technology greatly 
intensifies the environmental impact as compared to preindustrial 
technologies. The sheer magnitude of resource use depletes ecologi-
cal cycles and degrades the environment while the production and 
release of huge quantities of waste-much of it nonbiodegrad-
able-can overload and disrupt natural recycling processes. 
The most crucial factor, then, in any assessment of environmental 
realities is the level of technology (or income) available to a popula-
tion. Yet it is upon industrial technology that the "less developed" 
states necessarily pin their hopes for overcoming their poverty and 
meeting the demands of rapidly expanding populations. The danger 
of ecological backlash in this situation is illustrated by the advent 
of new agricultural methods to augment the food supply of poor 
nations. Substantially increased yields have been achieved, but es-
sential components of the new agriculture are intensive irrigation, 
fertilizer, pesticides and herbicides, all of which compound the envi-
ronmental impact of traditional agriculture. In addition, like all 
systems which depend on high applications of external energy for 
their stability, the new agriculture is far more fragile than the tradi-
tional methods it has replaced. Under ideal conditions the new seeds 
and techniques yield much higher harvests than the traditional 
ones, but if any single component fails or if there is an ecological 
reaction against the artificially maintained system, it collapses.8 
Already the vulnerability of the new agriculture, in combination 
with unfavorable weather and rising population, has raised the 
spectre of imminent mass starvation in South Asia and North Cen-
tral Africa. 
The highly publicized "energy crisis" of recent months has made 
much of the public in the U.S., Europe, and Japan particularly 
aware of one dimension of the environmental impact of technol-
ogy-resource depletion.7 Nazli Choucri describes two trends con-
cerning resource demand and supply which will have major interna-
tional implications. The first is the magnitude of rising consump-
tion in the industrialized nations. Figures for the United States are 
typical: since 1957 increases in the use of individual minerals have 
ranged from 54 percent for iron to 100 percent for nickel, 291 percent 
for bauxite and 1,845 percent for magnesium. In addition, there is 
a looming demand for resources in the less developed states which 
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have heretofore been basically suppliers but not consumers of these 
substances. As these countries begin to turn from economies based 
on primary production of raw materials to economies characterized 
by expanding processing and manufacturing sectors, their needs for 
basic resources ranging from petroleum and coal for energy to iron 
for tools and machinery will grow substantially. The probable re-
sult, in the case of at least some materials, will be to constrict the 
supply available to the presently industrialized world. 
The second and related trend is the rising price of minerals result-
ing from accelerating consumption and declining rates of discovery 
and exploitation of new reserves. The dilemma of resource supply 
lies not so much in absolute limits to the availability of minerals 
and fuel as in the escalating costs of extraction and, in some cases, 
decreasing quality of those raw materials. 
The most crucial resources for industrial states are: (1) those that 
provide energy, principally coal, petroleum, and natural gas, and (2) 
the metals, notably iron, the ferro alloys (manganese, chromium, 
vanadium, tungsten, cobalt, zirconium, nickel, and molybdenum) 
and copper, lead, zinc, tin, aluminum and magnesium. Although 
most of the known coal reserves of the world are located within the 
industrialized world, the opposite is the case for petroleum and most 
of the metals.8 
The present degree of dependency of industrialized states upon 
external mineral supplies ranges from almost 100 percent in the case 
of Japan to near self-sufficiency for the U.S.S.R. But, as a recent 
U.S. Bureau of Mines study concludes, the pattern of resource dis-
tribution in relation to consumption presages an increased reliance 
by all developed nations upon imports from the less-industrialized 
states.9 
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPAIRMENT FOR 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
We now return to a question posed earlier: on balance will the 
impact of environmental problems be in the direction of exacerbat-
ing or ameliorating international conflict? How can the former be 
minimized and the latter maximized? The most ambitious attempt 
to analyze the linkage between environmental phenomena and in-
ternational conflict has been that of Robert North and Nazli 
Choucri. Focusing upon the interaction between resources, popula-
tion, and technology, they have capsulized a plausible scenario. 
A combination of growing population and developing technologies 
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places rapidly increasing demands upon resources, often resulting in 
internally generated pressures. The greater this pressure, the higher will 
be the likelihood of extending national activities outside territorial 
boundaries. To the extent that two or more countries with high capabili-
ties and high pressure tendencies extend their interests and psycho-
political borders outward, there is a strong probability that eventually 
the two opposing spheres will intersect. The more intense the intersec-
tions, the greater will be the likelihood that competition will assume 
military dimensions. 10 
From this perspective the conflict potential among states which 
have reached a stage of economic "takeoff," i.e., with a high rate of 
industrial and technological advance characteristically accompa-
nied by rapid population growth, would seem to be considerable. In 
an increasingly organized society, escalating needs and desires can 
be effectively translated into pressures on the government because 
of the ability of literate citizenry to make their individual and 
collective demands, and because of the existence in many cases of 
institutions designed to be sensitive to those demands. Moreover, 
large increments in the politically articulate population can swamp 
existing political institutions, with destabilizing consequences in-
cluding an increasing response to radical or extreme nationalist pro-
posals for meeting the society's needs. To the extent that technologi-
cal advancement correlates with national power, such rising inter-
nal pressures are matched by capabilities for translating that pres-
sure into aggressive foreign policies. 
While the domestic tensions generated by rapid population 
growth are probably most severe in the poorest underdeveloped 
states, these societies lack the capacity to project them effectively 
into the international arena,u Ironically, population growth, while 
generating increasing pressures, further impairs national capabili-
ties. 12 Nevertheless, domestic instability within the less-
industrialized nations is not without consequences for international 
conflict. A state in constant turmoil is extremely vulnerable to out-
side penetration and manipulation. 
States unable to make a go of statehood threaten international order, 
not so much by their policies as by their predicaments-not because of 
what they may do, but because of what other states may do to them, in 
them, and with them.13 
A plausible example of such competitive interference by powerful 
states would involve an effort to secure control over some vital re-
source unavailable within their own boundaries. 
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In terms of the Choucri-North model, the likelihood of conflict 
involving the most advanced and highly industrialized states would 
seem to be relatively slight. Although they do exhibit rapidly esca-
lating technologies, their rates of population growth tend to be quite 
low. Moreover, a variety of factors severely constrain any tendencies 
toward armed conflict among these states, including the presence 
of nuclear weapons, the evident benefits to be derived from coopera-
tion and the equally evident costs of mutual antagonism, the demise 
of colonialism and the ideological and nationalistic barriers to its 
revival, and the tightening web of global interdependence. Many of 
these same considerations tend to militate against nonviolent forms 
of competitive expansion including economic warfare. Nevertheless, 
the possibility that steadily increasing pressure upon finite re-
sources will translate into some form of aggressive foreign policy 
cannot be lightly dismissed. Secretary of State Kissinger has al-
ready expressed deep concern that spiraling energy costs and 
resulting "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies could contribute to an eco-
nomic breakdown in the West analogous to that which spawned the 
Fascist regimes of the 1930's: 
If we do not get a recognition of our interdependence, the Western civili-
zation that we now have is almost certain to disintegrate because it will 
first lead to a series of rivalries in which each region will try to maximize 
its own special advantages. That inevitably will lead to tests of strength 
of one sort or another. These will magnify domestic crises in many 
countries, and they will then move more and more to authoritarian 
models. 
I would expect then that we will certainly have crises which no leader-
ship is able to deal with, and probably military confrontations. But even 
if you don't have military confrontations, you will certainly, in my view, 
have systematic crises similar to those of the twenties and thirties, but 
under conditions when world consciousness has become global. 14 
With these emerging realities-the increasing dependency of in-
dustrialized states upon external supplies of raw materials, the con-
tinued expansion of resource utilization, and the introduction of 
new demands by a developing Third World-the stage seems to be 
set for competition and conflict over mineral resources. At least 
three manifestations of this trend can be envisaged. First, as in the 
scenario suggested above, industrialized nations might seek to se-
cure scarce resources by exploiting political instability within less 
developed nations. At the same time these resource trends offer 
some raw material producing countries unprecedented opportuni-
ties for international influence. The most obvious example concerns 
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the growing economic and political leverage of the Middle East oil-
exporting states, which have begun to recognize and exploit the 
potentialities in the emerging configurations of world supply and 
demand-with at least some destabilizing results. Thus, the mere 
announcement of a selective export embargo by Arab oil producers 
was sufficient to generate deep political cleavages within the Atlan-
tic Alliance. 
A second arena of competition will involve those portions of the 
planet which hold the greatest potential of as yet unexplored and 
untapped sources of fuel and minerals-the continental shelves and 
deep sea bed. The potential for serious friction is already high as a 
result of rival claims among nations with the technological capabili-
ties to exploit those sources, and between those states and less ad-
vanced coastal nations attempting to reserve their off-shore waters 
for their own use. 
Finally, as the dependence of states upon external sources of raw 
materials increases, so will the importance of maintaining estab-
lished trading networks. Political upheavals or disputes which dis-
rupt trade patterns, even when not the result of competition for 
resources, could draw essentially neutral parties with no interest but 
the preservation of their resource supplies into the conflict. 
Once extracted and processed, resources create waste which must 
be disposed of; and it is this human and industrial refuse, in con-
junction with such deliberate products of modern technology as 
insecticides and synthetic fertilizers, that creates pollution. Pollu-
tion or waste problems can take on international implications in 
three ways. First, local environmental disruption affects regional 
and global ecosystem quality as a result of the complex chain of 
relationships on which those ecosystems are built. For example, 
when runoff from an orchard or a ri~e paddy sprayed with an insecti-
cide or herbicide enters a stream and disrupts the species diversity 
and natural balance, it has ramifications beyond the local absence 
of trout or fish-eating birds. Polluted ground-water means polluted 
water supplies and deterioration in larger rivers and estuaries. 
While the total ecosystem could undoubtedly function without one 
of the existing waterways, each one adds to the stable workings of 
the whole, and there is as yet little way of knowing how much 
perturbation the whole can withstand before its essential functions 
such as oxygen production and nutrient cycling are seriously dis-
rupted. Ensuing disturbance would follow no national boundaries; 
amorphous and long range in impact, such deterioration would af-
fect all earthbound communities to some degree. 
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There are numerous other illustrations of this threat. One of the 
most dramatic concerns the climatic changes brought about by the 
"greenhouse effect" discussed frequently in environmental litera-
ture. In the view of some scientists, the large amounts of carbon 
dioxide released into the atmosphere each year may come to form a 
layer enveloping the globe, through which the heat produced on 
earth by energy utilization and animal metabolism plus solar energy 
normally reflected back out into space cannot pass. If enough heat 
were trapped to raise the mean temperature of the atmosphere by 
four or five degrees, the ice caps of Antarctica and Greenland would 
melt, raising the levels of the oceans by at least forty feet. There is 
a contending argument that holds that a blanket of particulates and 
gaseous waste covering the planet would reflect the sun's energy 
away from the earth and cause a lowering of the mean temperature, 
instigating a new Ice Age. Each argument is imprecise and un-
proven, but they serve to illustrate the collective transnational im-
pact of originally local environmental disturbances. 
The second area of international significance involving environ-
mental pollution follows obviously from the first. Pollution enters 
river basins and atmospheric and oceanic currents which cross inter-
national frontiers; not only do these contaminants precipitate gen-
eral ecosystem change, they cause specific damage to the health, 
economy, and quality of life in the states which they enter. Exam-
ples of such inadvertent pollution of the air or water of neighboring 
states include the river basins of Europe such as the Danube, the 
Rhine, and the Meuse, all of which flow through and are industrially 
exploited by several states, much to the disadvantage of the down-
stream nations. Irrigation projects on the Colorado River within the 
territory of the United States have resulted in rising salinity of the 
waters available for agricultural use in Mexico. The acid rains of 
Sweden are a well-known case of the industrial activity of one coun-
try or countries, in this instance Britain and Central Europe, dam-
aging the economic resources of another. Timber production and 
salmon processing are important sectors of the Swedish economy 
which are being affected by the increased acidity of precipitation 
and ground water .15 
In each of these examples it is possible to identify the offending 
states and to instigate bilateral or multilateral discussions between 
interested governments to begin dealing with the problems, but 
many instances of transnational pollution have no clear source of 
origin, or no single victim. A regional example is the rainfall in 
Europe which has recently shown large increases in pesticide con-
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tent, probably as a result of agricultural spraying in North Africa. 
But the oceans, a vital link in the world ecosystem, present the most 
important example of the interrelatedness of the states which cause 
the problem and those which suffer its consequences. Increased in-
terest in the global ocean as a source of minerals and food has 
paralleled its rapid deterioration. Rivers add industrial and human 
wastes, resource exploitation on the continental shelves disrupts 
marine life, traditional fishing grounds and the stocks of migratory 
marine species such as whales are depleted, and ocean-going tankers 
and freighters spill oil; but the cumulative effects of these activities 
are impossible to gauge given the present state of our knowledge. 
Transnational pollution, then, provides potentially novel defini-
tions of aggression and difficult new issues of contention among 
states. But in addition to supplementing existing sources of conflict, 
environmental trends may create unprecedented instrumentalities 
for interstate violence and manipulation, e.g., geophysical warfare. 
The key to geophysical warfare is the identification of the environmental 
instabilities to which the addition of a small amount of energy would 
release vastly greater amounts of energy. Environmental instability is a 
situation in which nature has stored energy in some part of the earth or 
its surroundings far in excess of that which is usual. 16 
Emerging possibilities for exploiting such "instabilities" include 
deliberate weather modification, both local and global, and control 
of earthquakes and tidal waves. If such scenarios seem implausible, 
the development of more specific weapons purposely designed to 
damage the ecosystem of an enemy state is well advanced. The 
herbicides widely used in Vietnam are one example; other means 
have been designed to contaminate food, water, or air and divert 
water supplies. 
A final instance of environmental factors exacerbating tendencies 
toward interstate conflict involves the structure of the international 
political system. The basic configuration of that system can be char-
acterized as both anarchical and oligarchical; anarchical because of 
the lack of central authority capable of reconciling or suppressing 
the inevitable conflicts which arise as each state pursues its own 
national interests, and oligarchical because within any decentral-
ized system a rudimentary hierarchy forms which is a function of 
the power capabilities of its individual members. As Roger Masters 
points out in his comparison of world politics and primitive political 
systems, "If we speak of international 'anarchy,' it would be well to 
bear in mind that it is an 'ordered anarchy.' "17 
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While these attributes may remain essentially intact, the mem-
bership and structure of the hierarchy will clearly change. The new 
demands and requirements, the new areas of competition, and the 
new possibilities for aggression among states will alter existing pat-
terns of power. Although the foundations of power will continue to 
be technology and its prerequisites, resources and energy, it is the 
very importance of technology that increases the influence of those 
who control access to any of its components, which in many future 
cases will be the nations of the Third World. Power will gravitate 
toward some states which have as yet had little impact on the inter-
national system. The present hierarchy will be subverted. To the 
extent to which that hierarchy serves as a stabilizing influence in 
international politics, its erosion must have disruptive consequences 
at least in the short term. 
IV. FUNCTIONALIST AND RELATED REMEDIES 
Despite the potentialities for conflict in the impact of environ-
mental trends upon international politics, there is another side to 
the coin. The fact that the environment is no respecter of national 
boundaries strongly suggests that ecological deterioration must be 
attacked on an international, not to say global, basis if ameliorative 
steps are to be effective. This in turn gives rise to basic questions 
concerning the viability of nationalism, sovereignty, or any other 
potential barriers to international action. It can be argued that the 
environmental crisis is of such seriousness as to raise real doubt 
concerning the long term survival of the human species. In its stark-
est (and still conjectural) terms it poses to mankind the imperative: 
take vigorous cooperative measures-or die. At a minimum it would 
appear that only international collaboration can forestall a serious 
erosion of the quality of life stemming from environmental decline. 
In the view of many, the cooperative mandate inherent in envi-
ronmental problems provides fertile ground for an implantation of 
functionalist theory. Representative of this conviction is F. H. Knel-
man: 
Each day the evidence accumulates that pollution knows no boundaries, 
national or regional, and this principle of indivisibility, central to ecol-
ogy, creates the need for national interdependencies. David Mitrany has 
written prophetically that "sovereignty cannot in fact be transferred 
effectively through a formula, only through a function." I believe that 
new functions exist which transcend all possible reasons for resisting the 
transfer of sovereignty. The most important of these is the need for 
world control of pollution to avert a breakdown of the environment and 
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the ensuing catastrophic effects. The nature of the global threat tran-
scends ideological and political boundaries. Its analysis and control 
therefore require international cooperation. Functionalism has had 
mixed success in the past, but the novel situation prevailing in the 
second half of the twentieth century offers a new basis for using this 
approach. IS 
In short, these proponents see in global environmental protection 
the ultimate functional activity. 
David Mitrany, the primary spokesman for functionalism, has 
said, "I do not represent a theory. I represent an anxiety. "19 This 
attitude is prevalent throughout the functionalist literature which, 
as a result, is sometimes contradictory and often vague. Neverthe-
less, the basic argument is clear. Functionalism is essentially an 
approach to world order, a method of establishing world peace 
through the creation of transnational and international agencies 
charged with performing specific economic and social tasks. Man is 
seen as basically peaceloving but societal "diseases" such as pov-
erty, ill health, illiteracy, economic insecurity, social injustice, and 
exploitation subvert his natural inclinations and lead to war. Inter-
national functional agencies promise to eliminate war by attacking 
these problems and in the process gradually undermining the jeal-
ous sovereignties that fragment and divide the community of man. 
The state system cannot assure a durable peace because it has 
proven itself incapable of eliminating the societal defects mentioned 
above. While the nation-state has sovereignty over only a limited 
territory, the diseases of mankind, literally as well as metaphori-
cally, know only their own ecological boundaries. Consequently, the 
state has increasingly lost the ability to deal with the real problems 
of its own citizens; sovereignty stands indicted as a barrier to inter-
national stability. But the political problem posed by the nation-
state must be approached indirectly, by concentrating energies on 
the social and economic tasks. 
Sovereignty cannot in fact be transferred effectively through a formula, 
only through a function. By entrusting an authority with a certain task, 
carrying with it command over the requisite powers and means, a slice 
of sovereignty is transferred from the old authority to the new; and the 
accumulation of such partial transfers in time brings about a translation 
of the true seat of authority. 
[Functionalism is a method] which would ... overlay political divi-
sions with a spreading web of international activities and agencies, in 
which and through which the interests and life of all nations would be 
gradually integrated.20 
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This achievement rests on two closely related processes: task ex-
pansion and loyalty transfer. Theoretically, success in one area of 
functional endeavor will generate similar approaches in other fields 
"like the gradual functional subdivision of organic cells."21 At the 
same time, human loyalties will gradually be attracted to the 
emerging international agencies as these prove their capacity to 
solve these problems which the territorially bounded state cannot. 
Men will recognize international organizations as the giver of good gifts 
which their states are no longer able to provide; they will cease to regard 
the derogation of sovereignty as a dubiously permissible national sacri-
fice, and come to think of it as a transfer of authority which is essential 
to the attainment of desirable results, a profitable investment in the 
good life. 22 
Thus, the functionalist program for world order depends on the 
identification of relatively nonpolitical problems and the creation of 
functional agencies empowered and designed to cope with them. 
Solving these problems would eradicate war by eliminating its root 
causes and by creating a widespread feeling of community which 
would transcend national boundaries. Eventually these trends 
would eliminate the nation-state altogether and replace it with a 
network of authoritative global institutions responsible for coordi-
nating the activities of the functional agencies. 
It is not surprising that those who embrace the functionalist 
perspective have recently shown considerable interest in environ-
mental problems. The critical importance of these issues would sug-
gest them as potentially powerful agents of functionalist transfor-
mation. The functionalist, then, would answer the question posed 
earlier concerning the relationship between the environment and 
international politics by asserting that the environment could be an 
important influence in dampening international conflict if: (1) it is 
used to demonstrate the obsolescence of the nation-state and to 
build an alternative network of functional international organiza-
tions and (2) these international institutions prove effective in re-
versing the process of environmental deterioration. 
Functionalism constitutes a very attractive set of propositions, 
but serious reservations are justified nevertheless. First, there is the 
empirical observation that after nearly three decades of experience 
with the United Nations and a multitude of related international 
organizations, the functionalist vision seems almost as far from frui-
tion as ever. Second, the priorities of the functionalist are not those 
of the environmentalist. Functionalism is mainly concerned with 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 755 
the liquidation of the nation-state system; the solution of environ-
mental problems is valued to the extent it facilitates that endeavor. 
Third, is the time factor. As Inis Claude has put it, 
Functionalism is not in a hurry, and its claim to offer hope to the world 
is implicitly based upon the supposition that a long period is both neces--
sary and available for working out solutions to the problems. 23 
This gradualist approach is both explicit in functionalist writings 
and implicit in the argument that sovereignty can only be weakened 
and replaced by the erosion of its functions through strengthened 
economic and social linkages growing organically as needs arise. 
This attitude clearly does not do justice to the immediacy of envi-
ronmental problems. Solutions cannot be allowed to evolve over 
time but must be instigated expeditiously, based on clearly per-
cei ved needs and plans. 
The fourth problem with functionalism is its insistence on the 
separability of political and technical spheres of activity. One of the 
primary characteristics of environmental trends is their inseparabil-
ity from politics; the ecological manifestations of the problem can-
not be disjoined from their economic, societal, and political roots. 
If the environmental crisis is to be overcome, it must be approached 
from as many directions-politics included-as can offer hope of 
solution. 
Thus, from an environmental point of view, the objectives of the 
functionalist program are too political while the means are not polit-
ical enough. If functionalism is not conducive to an effective attack 
upon environmental problems, the tendency of these problems to 
generate and exacerbate international conflict will remain until 
more productive strategies are employed. 
The functionalists are not alone in their view that the state sys-
tem stands as the principal barrier to coping with the multiplicity 
of problems which afflict increasingly technologized modern socie-
ties. In his important book, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET, Richard Falk 
identifies and analyzes four dimensions of planetary danger in 
which he sees fundamental threats to man's future. The compo-
nents of this fourfold peril are the war system, population pressure, 
the insufficiency of resources, and environmental overload. "In ess-
ence," Falk says, "the threats are all outgrowths of the underlying 
circumstances of a mismanaged environment that is an inevitable 
result of a defective set of political institutions." The defective set 
of institutions is, of course, the nation-state system. 
It should hardly occasion surprise that the sovereign state-suitable for 
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a simpler world of more nearly autonomous units-cannot be expected 
to cope with the tasks of our world. The scope of modern problems 
clearly overwhelms the jurisdiction of many national governments; but 
also the nationalist way of doing things is becoming outmoded, given the 
circumstances of the endangered planet.24 
Unlike the functionalists, Falk urges an immediate and direct 
effort to make basic alterations in the international political system 
at the expense of national sovereignty. But is the underlying postu-
late, that the nation-state stands as an irremediable barrier to effec-
tive environmental action, a correct one? Falk and the functional-
ists posit a relationship between three variables: sovereignty, inter-
national conflict, and environmental decline. Sovereignty is identi-
fied as the root cause of international conflict and the principal 
obstacle to its amelioration and to environmental regeneration. The 
characterization of the relationship between sovereignty and inter-
national strife is well-founded. 25 But does the analysis of the linkage 
between sovereignty and environmental stress rest on equally solid 
ground? Is sovereignty the fundamental barrier to the control of 
environmental deterioration, as well as international conflict, mak-
ing the elimination or transformation of the nation-state the onerous 
but unavoidable task of contemporary statesmen? 
V. AN ALTERNATIVE ApPROACH 
There can be no doubt that over the long term a satisfactory 
solution of environmental and other rapidly developing global prob-
lems will necessitate a radical restructuring of international politics 
away from the state system toward various forms of international 
authority. But there is little prospect that this transformation can 
be effected before the end of the century. As Harold and Margaret 
Sprout observe, "The earth has become more fragmented politically 
in our era than ever previously since the formal emergence of the 
state system in the 1600s. Nationalism-expressing the demand for 
political identity and self-determination, as well as persistent dis-
trust of things foreign-is a value held with fanatical intensity by 
elites in the new nations and in most of the older ones tOO."28 And 
to make matters worse: "Social structures often persist long after 
they have become potentially unviable, even a menace to the wel-
fare of those who ostensibly derive benefit from them."27 Mitrany, 
in fact, identifies the consolidation of new states under new nation-
alisms as one of the two major political trends in the contemporary 
world. At the same time, the fragmentation of global politics has 
tended to erode that fragile and rudimentary approximation to uni-
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versal morality which underlies international law. Nothing remotely 
resembling world government is in prospect. Moreover, blueprints 
and proposals for world order systems tend to be viewed by policy-
makers as unrealistic and infeasible. The aversion of the Anglo-
American political ethos to grand theoretical schemes is a truism. 
Instead, in efforts to achieve international stability reliance is 
placed on bilateral and multilateral agreements amongst the great 
powers. As for the U.S.S.R., non-Marxist schemes for global author-
ity are seen as threatening to the prerogatives of the Soviet state and 
the promise of the October Revolution. And the post-colonial na-
tions of Africa and Asia greet with understandable suspiciOli calls 
that they subordinate their nationalistic ambitions of matching the 
power and wealth of the West to environmental and global order 
considerations. Every state has powerful domestic special interests 
(e.g., the military) which are similarly hostile to internationalism. 
Consequently, as Harold Lasswell, Richard Falk, and others have 
unhappily concluded, the present prospect that any world leader 
will give "effect to any counsel of reasonableness that involved a 
drastic change in international relations" for the purpose of global 
survival is dismally poor.28 
As a result those, like Falk, who see the transmutation of the state 
system as the sine qua non of effective environmental action are 
placed in a difficult position. They recognize that the initial impe-
tus for change must come at the national level, that the design and 
development of new "world order systems" remain under the control 
of state governments, and that "if there is a failure to achieve any 
reorientation on critical national levels, then almost any other effort 
at transformation will be nullified."29 In other words, "The pros-
pects for adaptive change depend on transforming existing values, 
attitudes, and institutions by bending them to new realities rather 
than starting fresh."30 But how is a commitment to such a radical, 
and to some degree self-liquidating, step to be generated amongst 
national regimes? Will governments participate in their own disso-
lution? Falk answers: 
They have no choice, if the basic line of analysis is correct. The available 
choice is whether governments will assist the process of dissolution and 
guide the outcome in a constructive direction or will resist dissolution 
and help induce a catastrophic breakdown in world afl'airs.3' 
In light of the previous discussion the latter pessimistic option 
would seem most probable. The avoidance of catastrophe, or coer-
cive solutions on the brink of catastrophe, depends on initiating 
massive programs to cope with environmental stress in the near 
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future. The first law of ecological politics is "the sooner the bet-
ter."32 Yet the tenacity of nationalisms and the obstacles arrayed 
against programs based upon blueprints for supranational authority 
offer little hope that perceptions of environmental deterioration or 
visions of international stability will provide the impetus for a 
breakthrough toward an environmentally sound world order system. 
Yet, in their eagerness to pronounce the death knell of the 
nation-state and power politics, the proponents of supra national 
authority fail to perceive the potentialities for positive action in-
herent in the state system. They argue that the nation-state is 
obsolete and that the only valid levels on which to deal with en-
vironmental realities are the local sphere where the consequences 
are most acutely felt, and the global level where, unhampered by 
artificially created national boundaries, an ecological perspective 
can be applied. However, keeping in mind that the deterioration of 
the environment continues, even while the political difficulties are 
being debated, the national governments emerge as the only level 
of organization with the resources, experience, and organization to 
act upon environmental information as it is gathered and analyzed. 
The functionalists acknowledge that nationalism can give rise to 
internationally constructive behavior but they do not seem to appre-
ciate the dimensions of this possibility. Rather than condemn out-
right such tenacious and prominent realities as national interest, 
nationalism, and power politics, surely the course of wisdom is to 
determine how these phenomena can be harnessed in the cause of 
environmental protection and international stability. 
This paper has emphasized the potentialities for increased inter-
national conflict inherent in environmental developments. To the 
degree to which it generates new sources and instruments of warfare 
and disrupts the existing hierarchy of international power, environ-
mental decline strikes at the heartland of state interest, i.e., na-
tional security-not to mention the effect upon living standards of 
rising costs associated with pollution and resource scarcity. The 
more serious these problems and the more interdependent the inter-
national system the more directly state interests are engaged. Ob-
serving the deleterious effect of competitive national drives for 
wealth and power upon the environment, Falk concludes that the 
nation-state must be effectively abolished. But alternatively it can 
be argued that since national interests are threatened by environ-
mental change, the more realistic short term requirement is for 
adaptive change in state policies. 
What all this suggests is that the antithetical relationship so often 
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posited between the competitive politics of state interest and the 
cooperative politics of international organization is misleading. For 
the functionalists and others it is almost axiomatic that progress 
concerning environmenal and world order goals will be achieved in 
direct proportion to the extent to which realpolitik is superseded by 
the politics of cooperation. Little thought is given to the possibility 
that the former can be harnessed in the service of the latter, i.e., 
that power politics and the state system can be eroded, and environ-
mental deterioration contained, by appealing directly to national 
interest and the concerns of power. This possibility is all the more 
important because, as previously contended, there is little prospect 
that any other considerations will motivate governments to instigate 
the thorough reevaluation of national priorities that is required. The 
rhetoric of apocalypse tends, over time, to deaden the nerves and 
paralyze the will of individuals and governments, even if the prog-
noses are well-founded. At the same time it is a dangerous strategy 
to wait for a crisis to validate the danger and precipitate action; the 
situation may already have deteriorated beyond remedy, or change 
under conditions of great stress may prove uncontrollable. 
Given the conflict potential inherent in environmental develop-
ments, it should be possible to articulate the need for radical envi-
ronmental action in terms of the value conventionally accorded 
highest priority in the state system, that of national security. The 
critics of functionalism are largely correct in their contention that 
political and technical issues are not readily separable, but this 
need not be a source of despair. Rather, the political consequences 
of ecological change can be exploited to speak to governments in 
terms which motivate policy. 
Specifically, statesmen must comprehend that a failure to deal 
resolutely with transnational pollution, resource and food scarcities, 
and population pressures may well precipitate (1) increasing ten-
sions conceivably including armed conflict between developed and 
less-developed nations, (2) growing and mutually destructive rival-
ries among the affluent nations of the West with corrosive effects 
upon the Atlantic Alliance, (3) a deterioration of the international 
monetary system and trading network, (4) a resurrection of the cold 
war as new areas of rivalry and vulnerability supplant outdated 
ideological divisions and (5) a worsening of even such previously 
close relationships as those between the United States and Canada 
or the United States and Mexico. All this is in addition to the 
potential corrosion of the domestic political and economic order 
previously noted. In sum, environmental deterioration imperils the 
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fabric of international relationships and domestic stability upon 
which national security rests. 
Policymakers must perceive this new dimension of security to be 
fully as salient as the more traditional military one. Looking ahead, 
the greatest threats to United States national security lie not in 
Communist aggression, or disruption of the Eurasian balance of 
power, or even the spread of radical revolutions in the Third World; 
but in the catalogue of macropolitical phenomena comprising en-
ergy, natural resources, food, population, pollution, and related is-
sues. If we see the future at all clearly, these matters will be an 
increasingly important factor in shaping bilateral and alliance rela-
tionships. They will assume growing significance in u.S.-Soviet de-
tente and in American relations with the developing nations. The 
recent speeches of Secretary Kissinger suggest a substantial and 
rapid evolution of his own views in this direction.33 However, the 
greater test of Washington's understanding and commitment will be 
whether oratory is made credible by changes in budgetary alloca-
tions and by political and financial commitments to international 
institutions, conferences, and law designed to facilitate a global 
approach to one or another aspect of the environmental threat. 
Such a reorientation of policy on the part of the United States or 
any other state will not be easily achieved. The meager results of 
the World Population Conference in Bucharest and the World Food 
Conference in Rome provide evidence on this point. Yet the inabil-
ity to achieve greater progress at the Conferences may be attributed 
to the fact that, with some exceptions, governments still do not 
perceive rapid population growth as a threat to their national secu-
rity. Energy, however, is increasingly perceived in these terms. Thus 
Mr. Kissinger's recent emphasis upon interdependence and the 
need for a qualitatively new level of cooperation among the indus-
trialized states has been unmistakably related to, and motivated by, 
the rise in the world market price of petroleum. In short, the disap-
pointments at Bucharest and Rome tends to support the thesis that 
it is only when environmental issues can be credibly articulated in 
terms of vital national interests that governments will generate the 
political commitment to deal effectively with them. 
Thus, instead of viewing the preoccupation with national security 
as an obstacle to constructive action, we should see it as a potential 
asset. It is significant that historically the only regular occasions 
when states have initiated drastic changes in established patterns 
of foreign policy and international cooperation have been during 
wartime-when the question of security is most sharply posed. The 
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traditional concern of functionalists and others interested in world 
order systems has been the elimination of war, and in this context 
nationalism has understandably been viewed as a major obstacle. 
However, when the focus shifts to confronting the environmental 
crisis, national egoism assumes a less threatening dimension. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When states begin to assess their long-range security in terms of 
emerging environmental realities, the primary policy options avail-
able to them will include increasing degrees of interstate collabora-
tion, both bilaterally and multilaterally. The same interrelatedness 
of environmental issues which catches each state up in an increasing 
web of conflict makes it clear, in many cases, that only transna-
tional solutions can deal adequately with the complexity of the 
problem. The immediate goal of such international cooperation 
would not be the subversion of the nation-state, but the solution to 
environmental deterioration and the threat it poses. Where it is 
most efficient and feasible for this purpose to utilize international 
institutions, they will be developed, but the basis of such coopera-
tion would remain a calculated assessment of national security. 
We have, then, a paradox-or more precisely two paradoxes-by 
which conflict becomes a potential source of international peace and 
national interest of international organization. These positive link-
ages have many possible dimensions as governments react in diverse 
ways to the various manifestations of the environmental threat. The 
risk of conflict stemming from competition for vital natural re-
sources and energy supplies is particularly critical because it con-
cerns elements which, combined with technological capabilities, 
now largely define a nation's power potential. One response, mani-
fested in the current round of U.N. conferences regarding the law 
of the sea, will be attempts to strengthen the fabric of international 
law and organization. But because of the wide-ranging implications 
of energy and resources for state interests, the principal trend may 
be towards internalizing national sources and supplies where possi-
ble-a process which has apparently already begun, as evidenced by 
"Operation Independence."34 It is conceivable that in the future 
sovereignty will be substantially defined in terms of the autonomy 
of a nation's energy supply. 
The limitations of this approach are obvious. For the vast major-
ity of nations, including such major economic powers as Japan, 
energy independence is simply unattainable, at least in the foresee-
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able future. Even for those few states for which it is a credible 
aspiration, the achievement of self-sufficiency in energy would not 
alter the fact of dependence upon imports for a growing list of raw 
materials. It may be helpful, however, if the adjustment of some 
major powers to the vulnerabilities of interdependence can be eased 
by the realization of partial independence in one major sphere of 
national activity. 
Current developments in the international petroleum market sug-
gest an alternative scenario. The recent successful coordination of 
production and export policies by the oil-producing countries, and 
the preliminary steps toward a united approach by the consuming 
nations, suggest at least the possibility that the conflict potential 
inherent in resource problems may be diverted into successful mul-
tilateral diplomacy. 35 
That this outcome is far from assured is suggested by continuing 
differences within OPEC concerning pricing policies and the reluct-
ance of France to relinquish its freedom of action in the interest of 
solidarity among the consumer nations. Moreover, we cannot dis-
miss the possibility that successful cooperation among producers on 
the one hand and consumers on the other will be merely a prelude 
to more intense conflict between the two groups. But again, if the 
constructive, rather than the destructive, possibilities of this situa-
tion are to be realized, it will be because both producer and con-
sumer nations will perceive their physical security and economic 
well-being, i.e. their vital national interests, to be imperiled by 
conflict and safeguarded by cooperation. 
There can be no doubt that security concerns must ultimately be 
translated into effective international' cooperation of a degree which 
will require drastic curtailment of state sovereignty. This is particu-
larly evident with regard to that dimension of the environmental 
threat involving the amorphous and unplanned accumulation of 
environmental stress, especially in the form of pollution and 
PQPulation growth. While these pressures have definite destabiliz-
ing consequences, their root causes are not traceable to specific 
conflict-producing intent on the part of anyone country. Because 
of the universality of cause, and the extent to which the effects are 
suffused throughout the globe by air and ocean currents and 
international waterways, this aspect of environmental deterioration 
is most adequately handled through international organizations. 
There are no defenses which individual states can establish against 
widespread environmental deterioration except through coordi-
nated international action, no aggressor except that each state is a 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 763 
polluter and depletor, and no victims except that every state is 
dependent on the biosphere. But any initiative for cooperation will 
come primarily from the realization on the part of individual states 
of the extent to which their security is threatened in the absence of 
cooperation. 
While states will bear the major burden in mobilizing a response 
to environmental deterioration and its consequences, nothing will 
prevent the application where politically acceptable of functionalist 
or other approaches which envisage a direct translation of environ-
mental decline into supra national institutional building, i.e., the 
transfer of the locus of political authority from the state to regional 
and global organizations. All the elements in the functionalist pro-
gram-the emphasis upon technical problems, international civil 
servants, expertise, international organizations, spillover, etc.-will 
remain relevant, as will emphasis upon the global dimensions of the 
environmental threat. In sum, there is no long-term incompatibility 
between functionalist and national interest approaches; each envis-
ages the eventual emergence of an international political system in 
which supra national institutions capable of coping with global 
problems are preeminent. Tlie two differ only in regard to the time 
frame involved and the proper strategy for the short and medium 
term. It is our contention that a national interest approach will 
prove the more productive during that period. 
For centuries, Niccolo Machiavelli has been the symbol of politi-
cal realism. His attitudes are represented wherever decisions are 
being made to secure national interests. 
For where the very safety of the country depends upon the resolution to 
be taken, no considerations of justice or injustice, humanity or cruelty, 
nor of glory and shame, should be allowed to prevail. But putting all 
other considerations aside, the only question should be, what course will 
save the life and liberty of the country?36 
The relevance and strength of the environmental perspective lies 
in the ability to couch its arguments in these terms. The "life and 
liberty" of the modern state is synonymous with environmentally 
enlightened political action. 
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